

continuing to work with you as the measure moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

GREGORY W. MEEKS,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2022.

Hon. GREGORY MEEKS,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN MEEKS: In recognition of the desire to expedite consideration of H. Res. 833, Expressing support for Moldova's democracy, independence, and territorial integrity and strengthening United States and Moldova relations, the Committee on Ways and Means agrees to waive formal consideration of the bill as to provisions that fall within the rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.

The Committee on Ways and Means takes this action with the mutual understanding that we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues within our jurisdiction. The Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or similar legislation.

Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming this understanding, and would ask that a copy of our exchange of letter on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H. Res. 833.

Sincerely,

RICHARD E. NEAL,
Chairman.

Mr. MEUSER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today in support of H. Res. 833, which expresses support for Moldova's democracy, independence, and territorial integrity and calls for strengthening U.S. and Moldova relations.

Needless to say, this is an especially opportune time to consider this resolution; not only because this year marks the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our two countries, but also given the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and the challenge it poses to other countries in the region, including Moldova.

Moldova's humanitarian response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its generosity have been truly remarkable. For example, Moldova has accepted nearly 434,000 Ukrainian refugees. To put that into perspective, that is around 5 percent of Moldova's entire population.

Not only does this resolution commend Moldova's strong support for Ukraine, but also commits the U.S. to continue to assist Moldova in addressing the economic impacts of the crisis, its energy security, and advancing democratic reforms.

I urge all my colleagues to join me in supporting this resolution to show that the U.S. Congress is committed to a long-term partnership with Moldova.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEUSER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I thank Representatives PRICE and PFLUGER for their work on this resolution.

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is making the whole of Europe less secure. U.S. support for our allies and partners must therefore extend to Ukraine's neighbors, like Moldova.

The ominous threat made by a Russian general last week that the Kremlin aimed to seize a land bridge from the Donbas to Odesa and then to Transnistria, the Russian-supported breakaway region in Moldova, shows why the U.S. must pay close attention to Moldova and its security.

Therefore, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this resolution to demonstrate the U.S. Congress' strong support of our friends in Moldova.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, again, I thank my friend for his bipartisan leadership and his support for this important piece of legislation.

Again, combined with the Georgia Support Act, this resolution sends a clear message from this body, on a bipartisan basis, that we will not tolerate Russian aggression in Europe in 2022.

Combined with our solidarity in opposition to the tragedy unfolding in Ukraine, it is a powerful message, backed up with, of course, support by our government, and the bipartisan nature of this is just so critical.

The people of Moldova, and the people of Georgia, and the people of Ukraine, they are watching and they are listening, as we hope is Vladimir Putin and his cronies in Moscow.

I urge support for this resolution, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 833, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. ROY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution 8, the yeas and nays are ordered.

Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion are postponed.

TRANSATLANTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ACT

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3344) to prioritize the efforts of and enhance coordination among United States agencies to encourage countries in Central and Eastern Europe to improve the security of their

telecommunications networks, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3344

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) fifth and future generation's telecommunication networks in allied and partner countries based on common, secure, transparent, democratic standards have the potential to increase cultural, political, and economic exchanges leading to mutual job creation, closer citizen relations, and stronger democratic institutions;

(2) Russia's unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal invasion of Ukraine and the People's Republic of China's tacit support for Russian Federation's actions demonstrate the importance of secure telecommunication infrastructure in Central and Eastern European nations;

(3) the United States has national security and economic interests in assisting Central and Eastern European countries to improve the security of their telecommunication networks by reducing dependence on covered telecommunication equipment or services that are often offered with predatory economic inducements and replacing them with secure telecommunication equipment or services;

(4) China's Belt and Road Initiative and the 17+1 Initiative seek to undermine Central and Eastern Europe's infrastructure resilience and sovereignty through predatory inducements from state-linked providers of telecommunication equipment or services such as Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation;

(5) China's 2017 National Intelligence Law obligates Chinese businesses to fully cooperate with state intelligence work, and thereby compromises the integrity of any network that utilizes equipment from Chinese companies because providers could be forced to hand over sensitive data or shut down networks at the command of China;

(6) Russia's campaign to elect a Russian national, who is a former Huawei Technologies Company executive, to serve as the Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is indicative of China and Russia's efforts to use international organizations to promote their interests and their malign influence;

(7) at global fora such as the ITU, the United States Government should actively support candidates that espouse democratic values, internet freedoms, and secure telecommunication networks;

(8) the United States International Development Finance Corporation's development priorities, as described in section 1412 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018, properly includes a focus on less developed countries;

(9) the United States should assemble a coalition of democratic and like-minded allies and partners to counter the rise of global malign actors such as China and Russia and build resilience in Central and Eastern Europe against malign influences; and

(10) in order to ensure robust military coordination and interoperability with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and transatlantic allies and partners, the United States should ensure that allies and

partners' telecommunication networks are secure and free from potential threats in accordance with the 2019 NATO London Declaration.

(b) **STATEMENT OF POLICY.**—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to strengthen the transatlantic alliance based on shared values in the face of rising malign influence from the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, countries that seek to undermine democratic institutions and values;

(2) to encourage public and private sector investment in European telecommunication infrastructure projects to ensure secure telecommunication and to catalyze economic advancement through the highest standards of transparency, accessibility, and competition;

(3) to provide economically feasible alternatives to financing from providers of covered telecommunication equipment or services;

(4) to engage in diplomacy with European allies and partners to strengthen the United States and European private sector efforts to develop common telecommunication technology and industry standards, and in turn promote them globally;

(5) to support the Three Seas Initiative organized by 12 Central and Eastern European countries of the European Union to increase infrastructure resiliency and reduce reliance on malign actors, including in the telecommunication space;

(6) to enhance telecommunication security and freedom around the globe by engaging in elections at the ITU and promoting the candidacies of individuals that will promote democratic values, the rule of law, technological freedoms, and telecommunication security;

(7) to support the people of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkan countries in their desire for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and economies through enhanced cross-border telecommunication infrastructure connectivity; and

(8) to ensure that frontline NATO allies have telecommunication services that cannot be controlled by China or Russia, especially considering Russia's illegal and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine.

SEC. 3. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION SECURITY CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR.

(a) **APPOINTMENT.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall appoint, from among existing personnel of the Department of State, an International Telecommunication Union Security Campaign Director (in this section referred to as the "Director").

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Director shall—

(1) lead efforts to promote candidates for elections at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) who will support and defend democratic values, internet freedom, and telecommunication security;

(2) coordinate with other officials of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Communications Commission, and other Federal departments and agencies to ensure efforts described in paragraph (1) are carried out in an organized, nimble, efficient, and effective manner;

(3) work with stakeholders in the private sector to harmonize efforts and to galvanize focus on elections at the ITU;

(4) use diplomatic tools of the Department of State to bolster support for candidates for elections at the ITU who will support and defend democratic values, internet freedom, and telecommunication security;

(5) brief Congress regularly on the implementation of the duties described in paragraphs (1) through (4) and, if appropriate, on requests for additional legislative authority necessary to enhance telecommunication se-

curity and freedom around the globe as described in section 2(b)(6); and

(6) report to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs regularly on development, progress, or setbacks with respect to support to the people of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkan countries as described in section 2(b)(7).

(c) **SUNSET.**—This section shall terminate on October 31, 2022.

SEC. 4. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE FOR TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—In carrying out the policy described in section 2(b), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the head of the Federal Communications Commission, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall, as appropriate, prioritize and expedite the efforts of the Department of State and those departments and agencies in supporting the efforts of the European Commission and the governments of Central and Eastern European countries to improve the security of their telecommunication networks, including through providing diplomatic and political support to the European Commission and Central and Eastern European countries, as necessary—

(1) to ensure European telecommunication networks are built securely, consistent with democratic values and principles such as privacy, including through early-stage project support and late-stage project support for the construction or improvement of telecommunication and related infrastructure;

(2) to remove covered telecommunication equipment or services and replace such equipment or services with secure telecommunication equipment or services;

(3) to support the development of telecommunication networks that are inclusive, transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally, and socially sustainable, compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations, and supplied by providers of secure telecommunication equipment or services; and

(4) to facilitate international coordination on cross-border telecommunication infrastructure construction and security standards to ensure cross-border telecommunications are secure.

(b) **PROJECT SELECTION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, and the Director of the Trade and Development Agency shall jointly identify telecommunication infrastructure projects that would advance the United States national security and be appropriate for United States assistance under this section.

(2) **PROJECT ELIGIBILITY.**—A project is eligible for United States assistance under this section if—

(A) the project—

(i) improves telecommunication networks through either hard infrastructure, such as telecommunication lines, towers, antennas, or other equipment, or soft infrastructure, such as innovative software development or cloud services;

(ii) is inclusive, transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally, and socially sustainable, compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations, and supplied with secure telecommunication equipment or services solely by providers of secure telecommunication equipment or services; and

(iii) does not use covered telecommunication equipment or services or removes covered telecommunication equipment or services and replaces such equipment or services with secure telecommunication equipment or services; and

(B) the project is located in a covered country.

(3) **PREFERENCE.**—In selecting among projects that are eligible under paragraph (2), the heads of the Federal departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) shall give preference to projects that—

(A) are located in Ukraine;

(B) can attract funding from the private sector, an international financial institution, the government of the country in which the project will be carried out, or the European Commission;

(C) have been designated as available for funding through the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund;

(D) are to be carried out in the Three Seas Initiative member nations;

(E) are to be carried out in NATO member states that meet or are making progress toward meeting their commitments to upholding the rule of law and preserving democratic institutions in accordance with the preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(F) are to be carried out in NATO member states that meet or are making demonstrable progress toward meeting their defense spending commitments in accordance with the 2014 NATO Wales Summit Declaration; or

(G) have the potential to advance United States economic interests.

(c) **TYPES OF ASSISTANCE.**—

(1) **DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT.**—The Secretary of State shall provide diplomatic and political support to the covered countries, as necessary, including by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the Department of State to build the capacity of covered countries to resolve any impediments to the development of projects selected under subsection (b).

(2) **INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPPORT.**—The Secretary of State shall seek to encourage international financial institutions, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Agency for International Cooperation of the Government of Germany, and the Development Agency of the Government of France to invest in telecommunication infrastructure resiliency in Central and Eastern Europe.

(3) **EARLY-STAGE PROJECT SUPPORT.**—The Director of the Trade and Development Agency shall provide early-stage project support with respect to projects selected under subsection (b), as necessary.

(4) **LATE-STAGE PROJECT SUPPORT.**—The heads of the Federal departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) that provide late-stage project support shall do so, with respect to projects selected under subsection (b), as necessary.

(5) **UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION SUPPORT.**—The United States International Development Finance Corporation is authorized to provide support for projects under this section in covered countries that are countries with upper-middle-income economies or high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association (collectively referred to as the "World Bank")), notwithstanding the restriction contained in section

1412(c)(2) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)(2)).

SEC. 5. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the progress made in providing assistance for projects under section 4 that includes—

(1) a description of the telecommunications infrastructure projects the United States has identified for such assistance; and

(2) for each such project—

(A) a description of the role of the United States in the project, including in early-stage project support and late-stage project support;

(B) the amount and form of debt financing, equity financing, and insurance provided by the United States Government, the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, and international financial institutions, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Agency for International Cooperation of the Government of Germany, and the Development Agency of the Government of France for the project;

(C) the contractual terms of the project that preclude the use of covered telecommunication equipment or services and steps taken to ensure providers of telecommunication equipment or services meet such contractual terms; and

(D) an update on the progress made on the project as of the date of the report.

(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) COVERED COUNTRY.—The term “covered country” includes—

(A) any member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that—

(i) shares a border with the Russian Federation; and

(ii) according to World Bank official data for 2020, has a Gross Domestic Product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, of less than \$45,000; and

(B) any European country that—

(i) has not participated or aided in Russia's invasion of Ukraine; and

(ii) according to World Bank official data for 2020, has a Gross Domestic Product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, of less than \$34,000.

(2) COVERED TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES.—The term “covered telecommunication equipment or services” means any of the following:

(A) Telecommunication equipment or services produced or provided by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).

(B) Telecommunication equipment or services produced or provided by an entity that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation.

(3) EARLY-STAGE PROJECT SUPPORT.—The term “early-stage project support” includes—

(A) feasibility studies;

(B) resource evaluations;

(C) project appraisal and costing;

(D) pilot projects;

(E) commercial support, such as trade missions, reverse trade missions, technical workshops, international buyer programs, and international partner searchers to link suppliers to projects;

(F) technical assistance and other guidance to improve the local regulatory environment and market frameworks to encourage transparent competition and enhance telecommunication security; and

(G) long-term telecommunication sector planning.

(4) LATE-STAGE PROJECT SUPPORT.—The term “late-stage project support” includes debt financing, equity financing, insurance, and transaction advisory services.

(5) SECURE TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT OR SERVICES.—The term “secure telecommunication equipment or services” means telecommunication equipment or services that are not, and do not contain, covered telecommunication equipment or services.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MEUSER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 3344, as amended.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3344, as amended, the Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act.

Let me start by thanking Representative MARCY KAPTUR of Ohio, the chairwoman of the Ukraine Caucus here in Congress. She has been an incredible leader and a very important voice for Ukraine, not just these past 2 months, but for decades as a Member of Congress. This bill is part and parcel of her many efforts to aid the people of Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

I emphasize a key point throughout my remarks today: Telecommunication security is a central pillar of national security.

If a hostile power has the ability to shut down a country's access to the internet, then both telecommunications and national security have, in fact, been breached.

If a strategic competitor can disable telecoms gear or cut an underseas cable to turn off a country's mobile network, then both telecommunications and national security have, in fact, been breached.

And if foreign rivals can snoop on a country's calls and steal classified in-

formation because they can access the network, then both telecommunications and national security have, in fact, been breached.

The lesson is clear: The United States and its allies cannot rely on telecoms gear produced and supplied by countries and companies close to the People's Republic of China government or the Putin regime in Moscow. This is especially true in Eastern Europe, as President Putin has decided to act on violent imperial hubris rather than respect the law of nations.

If the problem is PRC-affiliated technology and Russian aggression, then the Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act is a key part in the solution to bolster our national security and that of our friends and allies.

First and foremost, the bill allows the Development Finance Corporation to fund telecom security projects to ensure that all network gear in Eastern Europe is safe. As Ukraine faces the immediate threat to its national security, projects in the region must and will receive priority assistance.

Second, this bill authorizes the State Department to create a new position of campaign coordinator at the Department to focus on upcoming elections in the U.N. body called the International Telecommunications Union. That election comprises of an American with significant experience with the ITU and a Russian who previously worked for the Chinese company, Huawei. What could go wrong with that?

This is an election the free world can ill afford to lose, and we must do everything in our power to ensure corrupt actors are kept from its power. This includes a whole-of-government response, such as the State Department working with Commerce and the FCC, as well as the Foreign Affairs Committee teaming up with our good friends on the Energy and Commerce Committee to make sure the ITU promotes free and secure telecom systems around the globe.

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The TTSA is a critical bill that would deliver tangible security benefits for Ukraine and frontline NATO allies. We can, should, and must get this bill to the President's desk quickly.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to make that reality one step closer by voting for this legislation today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEUSER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this bipartisan bill, the Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act. This legislation authorizes the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to provide financing for secure 5G and future generations telecommunications infrastructure development projects in select Central and Eastern European countries with upper-middle-income economies or high-income economies.

This authorization aims to push back against CCP efforts to dominate the 5G and future generations telecommunications networks of our strategic allies and partners in the region, many of whom are NATO allies.

Ensuring the security of the telecommunications network of our NATO allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe is unquestionably in the U.S. national security interest.

Moreover, this bill targets the majority of countries in the Three Seas Initiative. Launched by 12 of our close friends in Central and Eastern Europe, the Three Seas Initiative seeks to expand cross-border energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure, as well as boost economic development in the region. Though it is a regional initiative, it has global implications that serve not only European but U.S. security and economic interests.

We in Congress have expressed great concern that CCP is exporting corruption, debt traps, and poor labor and environmental standards to Europe and across the world through its 17+1 and Belt and Road initiatives. The Three Seas Initiative seeks to address these concerns by providing positive alternatives to PRC investments in the region, including in its 5G and future telecom networks.

The last administration successfully convinced most of Central and Eastern Europe to opt not to use high-risk Chinese suppliers in their telecommunications networks. Supporting the Three Seas Initiative's efforts to expand secure digital infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe will carry forward this major foreign policy success and ensures the transatlantic community remains united in its clear-eyed assessment of the threat the CCP poses to telecommunications security.

In addition, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine must serve as a wake-up call to the dangers of allowing our adversaries to expand their influence in critical sectors of our economies. In particular, Europe's energy dependence on Russia has made it difficult to rally the continent around tougher sanctions and is funding the Kremlin's war machine to the tune of about \$1 billion every day. This is not in Europe's or the United States' national security interests.

We cannot wait for a potential conflict over Taiwan to assist our closest allies and partners in Europe and beyond in cutting out the CCP's malign influence now that it has been used to gain leverage over our democratic allies. This bill would help ensure we learn from our collective past mistakes.

Lastly, this bill is important because it directs the Secretary of State to appoint a campaign director among existing personnel for the upcoming election at the International Telecommunications Union, the ITU, which sets global standards for technologies such as 5G.

Russia's campaign to elect a Russian national who is a former Huawei execu-

tive to serve as the secretary general of the ITU is indicative of Russia's and China's efforts to use international organizations to promote their interests and malign influence.

The United States should ensure that we are coordinated in driving support for the U.S. candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, for the secretary general of the ITU, but the State Department should also engage on the important down-ballot races at the ITU.

There are four other posts of significance within the ITU's leadership structure, including the director of the ITU Development Sector, the ITU-D. The ITU-D plays a particularly vital role in supporting multilateral cooperation for fair and open internet governance through trustworthy deployment of digital technologies in the developing world.

The U.S. must be doing everything we can to ensure Russian and Chinese malign influence does not grow. This bill would help.

The Three Seas Initiative seeks to address threats posed by the CCP by providing positive alternatives to PRC investments in the region, including in its 5G and future telecoms networks.

We must support our allies in Central and Eastern Europe as they seek, through the Three Seas Initiative, to reduce their dependence on Moscow's and Beijing's economic overtures. Only together can we face the threats posed by the authoritarian regimes in China and Russia.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, again, I thank my friend for his leadership and bipartisanship on this critical piece of legislation. I think it is timely. I think it is urgent. I urge my colleagues to support the legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. CONNOLLY) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3344, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. ROY. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution 8, the yeas and nays are ordered.

Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion are postponed.

COUNTERING MALIGN RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA ACT

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7311) to direct the Secretary of State to develop and submit to Congress a strategy and implementation plan outlining United States efforts to counter the malign influence and ac-

tivities of the Russian Federation and its proxies in Africa, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7311

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States—

(1) should regularly assess the scale and scope of the Russian Federation's influence and activities in Africa that undermine United States objectives and interests; and

(2) determine how—

(A) to address and counter such influence and activities effectively, including through appropriate United States foreign assistance programs; and

(B) to hold accountable the Russian Federation and African governments and their officials who are complicit in aiding such malign influence and activities.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN; REPORT.

(a) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy and implementation plan outlining United States efforts to counter the malign influence and activities of the Russian Federation and its proxies in Africa, including programs and other initiatives designed to—

(1) strengthen democratic institutions, improve government transparency and accountability, improve standards related to human rights, labor, anti-corruption initiatives, fiscal transparency, monitor natural resources and extractive industries, and other tenets of good governance; and

(2) monitor and report on Russian political influence and disinformation operations and the activities of Russian, Russia-connected, or Russian-funded private military contractors in Africa.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the strategy and implementation plan required by subsection (a) and related efforts to counter the malign influence and activities of the Russian Federation and its proxies in Africa.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of the scope and nature of the Russian Federation's malign influence and activities and related diplomatic, economic, and security priorities and strategic objectives of such engagement in Africa, including influence and activities that involve Russian proxies, such as Russian oligarchs, Russian-funded private military contractors, and other individuals and entities directly or indirectly employed by or financially or politically associated with Russia and its officials, who are involved in or aid activities to, among other things—

(i) manipulate African governments and their policies, as well as the public opinions and voting preferences of African populations and diaspora groups, including those in the United States; and

(ii) invest in, engage, or otherwise control strategic sectors in Africa, such as mining